

# Appendix D

## Micro Level Voting Behavior Models

I report more details of the micro level models that serve as the basis for much of the analysis in Chapter 4 here. I begin in Table D.1 with models in which a dichotomous indicator indicating support for a Democratic congressional candidate is the dependent variable. These results are based on the analysis of multiple ANES cross-sections, with individuals embedded within years. Due to the hierarchical structure of the data and the dichotomous dependent variable, these results are estimated with multi-level logit. The first model represents the model that was the basis for producing Figure 4.5 in the main text. We see a clear negative effect of top income shares on support for democratic candidates. Model 2 shows that this effect remains when including a linear time trend. And Model 3 shows that the effect is still present with a control for partisanship. Model 4 shows the results that produced Figure 4.6 in the main text. The key point here is that none of the interactions between trust and inequality are statistically significant.

Table D.2 shows similar models but now including racial attitudes and an interaction between racial attitudes and inequality to see how the effect of inequality on voting behavior varies for those with differing degrees of racial bias. The first model is the basis of Figure 4.7 in the main text. There we saw visually what the coefficients in this model show—that rising inequality is associated with more support for Democrats among those with egalitarian racial attitudes while that effect is reversed among those with inegalitarian racial attitudes. Model

Table D.1: Multi-Level Models of Support for Democratic House Candidates

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Top .01% Share	-0.086*** (0.019)	-0.106* (0.054)	-0.067** (0.026)	-0.145 (0.126)
Female	-0.008 (0.042)	-0.008 (0.042)	-0.038 (0.044)	0.002 (0.042)
White Non-Hispanic	-1.519*** (0.060)	-1.518*** (0.060)	-0.784*** (0.073)	-1.494*** (0.058)
Age	-0.006*** (0.001)	-0.006*** (0.001)	-0.002 (0.001)	-0.005** (0.002)
Education	-0.077*** (0.018)	-0.077*** (0.018)	0.005 (0.015)	-0.078*** (0.019)
Income	-0.167*** (0.023)	-0.167*** (0.023)	-0.097*** (0.020)	-0.198*** (0.020)
Year Trend		0.002 (0.006)		
Partisanship			-0.690*** (0.031)	
Trust Sometimes				0.337 (0.319)
Trust Most of Time				0.324 (0.382)
Trust About Always				0.615 (0.519)
Trust Some $\times$ Top .01% Share				0.047 (0.111)
Trust Most $\times$ Top .01% Share				0.046 (0.149)
Trust Always $\times$ Top .01% Share				-0.026 (0.169)
Constant	2.888*** (0.132)	-1.205 (11.014)	4.086*** (0.141)	2.633*** (0.393)
Level 1 N	23404	23404	23269	18214
Level 2 N	27	27	27	23

Standard errors in parentheses

\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

Table D.2: Multi-Level Models of Support for Democratic House Candidates, with Racial Attitudes

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Top .01% Share	0.313*** (0.032)	0.338*** (0.038)	0.177* (0.088)
Female	-0.111* (0.047)	-0.080 (0.060)	-0.118** (0.037)
Age	0.002 (0.002)	0.000 (0.003)	-0.006** (0.002)
Education	-0.061*** (0.017)	-0.073*** (0.015)	-0.105*** (0.027)
Income	-0.167*** (0.031)	-0.156*** (0.033)	-0.184*** (0.020)
Conservative Ideology	-0.603*** (0.064)	-0.614*** (0.051)	
Racial Inegalitarianism	0.082** (0.030)	0.031 (0.038)	
Racial Inegalitarianism × Top Share	-0.084*** (0.010)	-0.073*** (0.012)	
White Non-Hispanic		-1.207*** (0.115)	-1.453*** (0.106)
Civil Rights About Right			-0.257 (0.229)
Civil Rights Too Fast			-0.179 (0.248)
About Right × Top Share			-0.139 (0.094)
Too Fast × Top Share			-0.269* (0.112)
Constant	3.213*** (0.211)	4.550*** (0.267)	3.170*** (0.319)
Level 1 N	9845	8767	9693
Level 2 N	18	18	13

Standard errors in parentheses

\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

1 focuses on white non-Hispanics only. Model 2 shows similar results when we focus only on respondents living in northern states. Finally, Model 3 shows that there is a similar pattern when we use a measure of racial attitudes focused on the speed of civil rights progress.

Finally, in Table D.3 I show the underlying models for Figures 4.8 and 4.9 in the main text. These are multi-level models based on CCES data with individuals nested in states. These results simply show what was reported earlier—higher inequality tends to increase support for Trump in rich states and among those with higher levels of education.

Table D.3: Multi-Level Models of Trump Support

	(1)	(2)	(3)
R Partisanship	1.112*** (0.024)	1.112*** (0.024)	1.116*** (0.023)
Female	-0.170** (0.061)	-0.170** (0.061)	-0.182** (0.061)
Family Income	-0.016* (0.008)	-0.016* (0.008)	-0.014 (0.008)
Education	-0.293*** (0.024)	-0.293*** (0.024)	
Age	0.025*** (0.002)	0.025*** (0.002)	0.026*** (0.002)
Top 1% Share in State	0.017 (0.010)	-0.065 (0.075)	-0.043 (0.027)
State Median Income	-0.000*** (0.000)	-0.000* (0.000)	-0.000*** (0.000)
Top Share $\times$ State Median Income		0.000 (0.000)	
High school graduate			-0.772 (0.670)
Some college			-1.224 (0.658)
2-year			-1.684** (0.650)
4-year			-1.892** (0.713)
Post-grad			-2.161** (0.690)
High School $\times$ Top Share			0.059* (0.028)
Some College $\times$ Top Share			0.061* (0.026)
2-year $\times$ Top Share			0.081** (0.027)
4-year $\times$ Top Share			0.061* (0.028)
Post-grad $\times$ Top Share			0.063* (0.028)
Constant	-3.152*** (0.464)	-1.800 (1.439)	-2.899*** (0.786)
Level 1 N	29563	29563	29563
Level 2 N	50	50	50

Standard errors in parentheses

\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$