Narrowing the Channel
The Politics of Regulatory Protection in International Trade
9780226669366
9780226669533
Narrowing the Channel
The Politics of Regulatory Protection in International Trade
While large, multinational corporations have supported the removal of tariffs, behind the scenes these firms have fought for protection in the form of product regulations, including testing, labeling, and registration requirements. Unlike tariffs, these regulations can raise fixed costs, excluding smaller firms from the market and shifting profits toward global giants.
Narrowing the Channel demonstrates that globalization and globalized firms can paradoxically hinder rather than foster economic cooperation as larger firms seek to protect their markets through often unnecessarily strict product regulations. To illustrate the problem of regulatory protectionism, Robert Gulotty offers an in-depth analysis of contemporary rulemaking in the United States and the European Union in the areas of health, safety, and environmental standards. He shows how large firms seek regulatory schemes that disproportionately disadvantage small firms. When multinationals are embedded in the local economy, governments too have an incentive to use these regulations to shift profits back home. Today, the key challenge to governing global trade is not how much trade occurs but who is allowed to participate, and this book shows that new rules will be needed to allow governments to widen the benefits of global commerce and avoid further inequality and market concentration.
Narrowing the Channel demonstrates that globalization and globalized firms can paradoxically hinder rather than foster economic cooperation as larger firms seek to protect their markets through often unnecessarily strict product regulations. To illustrate the problem of regulatory protectionism, Robert Gulotty offers an in-depth analysis of contemporary rulemaking in the United States and the European Union in the areas of health, safety, and environmental standards. He shows how large firms seek regulatory schemes that disproportionately disadvantage small firms. When multinationals are embedded in the local economy, governments too have an incentive to use these regulations to shift profits back home. Today, the key challenge to governing global trade is not how much trade occurs but who is allowed to participate, and this book shows that new rules will be needed to allow governments to widen the benefits of global commerce and avoid further inequality and market concentration.
240 pages | 32 figures, 21 tables | 6 x 9 | © 2020
Chicago Series on International and Domestic Institutions
Political Science: Diplomacy, Foreign Policy, and International Relations
Reviews
Table of Contents
Preface
Part I. A Theory of Regulatory Protection
Chapter 1. Introduction
Chapter 2. A Theory of Global Firms and Local Regulation
Part II. Evidence
Chapter 3. Determinants of Regulatory Barriers to Trade
Chapter 4. Regulatory Preferences in the Chemical Industry
Chapter 5. Regulatory Preferences in the Food Industry
Part III. Institutional Design
Chapter 6. The Design of Reciprocal Trade Agreements
Chapter 7. Designing Optimal Standards Agreements
Chapter 8. Conclusion: Markets and Borders
Technical Appendix
Notes
References
Index
Part I. A Theory of Regulatory Protection
Chapter 1. Introduction
Chapter 2. A Theory of Global Firms and Local Regulation
Part II. Evidence
Chapter 3. Determinants of Regulatory Barriers to Trade
Chapter 4. Regulatory Preferences in the Chemical Industry
Chapter 5. Regulatory Preferences in the Food Industry
Part III. Institutional Design
Chapter 6. The Design of Reciprocal Trade Agreements
Chapter 7. Designing Optimal Standards Agreements
Chapter 8. Conclusion: Markets and Borders
Technical Appendix
Notes
References
Index
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